The problem with most published work on notational or performance analysis of squash is that it is stroke or technique centered. The simplest example of notational analysis would be when a squash coach charts one of their player’s matches by putting a “W” (for winnner) or “E” (for error) on a diagram of a squash court.
Another example of technique-centered performance analysis was our 1987 Squash Canada Level 4 Performance Analysis Task, where we had to chart a video of a match between Dale Styner and John Fleury (both Canadian National Team members), recording every stroke played and the result of the stroke. The output of the analysis was a summary chart of statistics: number of shots played, percentage of winners and errors for each stroke type (forehand drive, backhand drop, etc.).
Information of this type, without a tactical context is not very useful: for example a player’s technique, and associated success ratio, in the back of the squash court is very different depending on the difficulty of the received shot, the amount of pressure the player is under, and the characteristics of the opponent (fast vs. slow, retriever vs. shot-maker, etc.).
The best analyses are based on a defined tactical model in order to be able to make precise, specific recommendations to players concerning the improvement of their game. When I teach the current Level 4 Performance Analysis Task for Squash Canada, the first assignment in the class is for each of the coaches to present the tactical model they use for coaching their players.
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of notational analysis based on a tactical model, I used the Dartfish Tagging module to analyze the first 25 points of the first game of the 2006 British Open Final (purchase DVD here) between Nicol David (current World #1) and Rachel Grinham. In this example I restricted the analysis to the backcourt.
The tactical model I used for the example analysis is the “zone” model I developed with the assistance of Princeton’s Gail Ramsay and Bob Callahan in the late 1990’s: System 3. The idea for a zone model was based on Jack Fair’s “Traffic Light” Model (red, amber, and green) for hardball squash, and the tennis tactical model (Methode des actions) used by Tennis Canada starting in the early 1990’s (copied and adapted a few years later by Nick Bolletieri: System 5). It should be mentioned that the Squash Canada Coaching Program independently adapted Tennis Canada’s Action Method into their own tactical model (less directive and evolved than System 3).
The model functions by dividing the squash court into three zones: front, mid, and back, and using the difficulty of the ball received by the player (easy, medium, difficult), to determine the tactical objective of the player’s shot (attack, rally, defend). The player realizes their tactical objective by choosing a particular technique (e.g., attack a loose ball in the mid-court with a cross-court volley nick). We have developed a “System 5” for international level players which features two more tactical objectives (force and counter-attack) as well as the use of deception.
In the first part of the analysis, we focused on what David did on defence (against a difficult ball) in the back-court:
- out of 25 shots to the back, David was on defence (forced use of wrist only, stretched-leaning back, adapted swing) only eight times – her very quick perception got her into position quickly enabling her to “rally” most of the balls;
- she was able to hit good drives 5/8 times (4/5 straight), being forced to boast only once, with only 2 “bad” (loose) shots;
- she needed, and was very good at “adapted” shortened swings (versus the full drives we normally teach) and use of the wrist;
- although not a direct goal of the analysis, it is clear that against Grinham, David’s high percentage of volleys in the mid-court, dramatically reduced the number of times she had to play the ball off the back of the court.
- often she is not looking at the ball/opponent as her opponent impacts the ball, perhaps indicating reliance on the tactical knowledge of her opponent’s tendencies -perhaps Rachel should have tried a few more “surprise” shots.
Here are the back-court video clips, with the “bad” shots towards the end of the video. Pausing the video gives insight into her approach into the back, her hitting position, and her recovery back to the “T”. In our next post we will examine Nicol David “rallying” from the back-court.